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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided three cases this past year 
involving juveniles, all in the delinquency field involving significant but 
technical matters.
1
  In the first case, the court held that it was necessary to prove 
that a school police officer was the designee of the school principal in order for a 
juvenile to be adjudicated for committing trespass on school grounds.
2
  In the 
second case, the court held, over a dissent, that a juvenile who committed several 
acts of indirect criminal contempt could be sentenced to consecutive periods of 
secure detention for each of the two offenses,
3
 thus resolving a conflict in the 
district courts of appeal.
4
 In the third case, the court held that a juvenile detention 
center falls within the criminal law definition of a detention facility.
5
 
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy in the juvenile 
delinquency field, deciding both important issues and also reversing regretful 
fundamental errors by the trial courts.
6
  In the dependency and termination of 
parental rights (“TPR”) field, the appellate courts were less busy, but 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  This 
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013.  The 
author thanks law librarian Robert Beharriell, Esq. for his help in the preparation of this survey. 
1. J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. II), 101 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); 
Hopkins v. State (Hopkins II), 105 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427–
28 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
2. J.R., 99 So. 3d at 428. 
3. Compare J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356, with J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 
(Quince, J., dissenting). 
4. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 353, 357.  Compare J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. I), 53 So. 3d 
1245, 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011), (unpublished 
table decision), aff’d, 101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 
1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
5. Hopkins II, 105 So. 3d at 471. 
6. P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 981, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.G. v. 
State, 84 So. 3d 1162, 1163–64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
1
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nonetheless, decided several important cases.
7
  And again, some of the opinions 
involved rudimentary trial court error.
8
 
II. DEPENDENCY 
Issues regarding non-offending parents come up regularly in the 
appellate decisions in Florida, including issues of due process.
9
  In A.S. v. 
Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of E.G-S.),
10
 a 
dependency petition was filed against a mother who was divorced and in which 
the petitioner made no allegation against the father.
11
  After a trial on the 
petition, the court found the child dependent and ordered the child placed with 
the non-offending father, terminated its jurisdiction along with Department of 
Children and Families’ (“DCF” or “Department”) supervision.12  The mother 
based her appeal on a violation of her due process rights, resulting in the court’s 
termination of jurisdiction and supervision, without a hearing.
13
  The appellate 
court agreed.
14
  The mother was entitled to notice that the court would determine 
the child’s permanent placement at the dispositional hearing, and further that “a 
court may not place [the] child permanently with [the] non-offending parent 
when the offending parent is either in substantial compliance with [the] 
reunification . . . plan or the time for compliance has not expired.”15  The court 
then remanded for an “evidentiary hearing to determine whether allowing the 
case to remain pending while [the mother] complete[d] her case plan would be 
detrimental to the child’s interest, and . . . whether a preponderance of the 
evidence support[ed] changing the goal of [the] case plan” to custody for the 
father.
16
 
In F.O. v. Department of Children & Families,
17
 a father appealed an 
order after the adjudicatory hearing found no evidence that he abused, 
abandoned, or neglected the children, and entered the mother consent plea to the 
petition for dependency.
18
  The problem was that the trial court nonetheless 
                                                 
7. See infra Parts II, III. 
8. See id. 
9. See Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 180 
(2011) [hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
10. 113 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
11. Id. at 78. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 79–80. 
14. Id. at 80. 
15. In re Interest of E.GS., 113 So. 3d at 79. 
16. Id. at 80. 
17. 94 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
18. Id. at 709–10. 
2
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ordered the father to participate in the case plan.
19
  Relying upon two earlier 
intermediate appellate court decisions, but without any discussion, the appellate 
court held that even when the parent had not been found to have abused, 
neglected, or abandoned the child at issue, the parent could be ordered to 
participate in the case plan.
20
 
In M.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of 
T.B. & T.P.),
21
 the issue was whether temporary legal custody could be shared 
with DCF in a case where the dependency adjudication by consent was made as 
to the father, but an order of dependency was withheld as to the mother, except 
for the case plan for the children.
22
  In its order, the trial court determined that 
remaining in the mother’s custody, with protective supervision, was in the best 
interests of the children.
23
  However, the order also determined that the mother 
“share temporary physical custody of the children” with the DCF.24  Given the 
trial court’s grant of legal custody of the children to the mother, it was reversible 
error to also order temporary physical custody of the children to the 
Department.
25
 
Once parents have completed tasks assigned to them pursuant to a case 
plan after a finding of or consent to dependency, they may seek reunification 
with their children.
26
  However, a trial court must determine if the parents 
“compli[ed] with the case plan” and if “reunification [is] detrimental to the 
child” before considering an order of reunification.27  In addition, “[t]he court is 
also [obligated] to make written . . . findings as to the six statutory factors.”28  In 
Department of Children & Families v. W.H.,
29
 the trial court failed to make 
findings on a number of the statutory factors.
30
  Nor was there competent 
evidence in support of finding the factors; DCF did not have notice that a 
hearing may result in the possibility of reunification, and no evidence of the issue 
                                                 
19. Id. at 710. 
20. Id. 
21. 107 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
22. Id. at 516. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 516–17. 
26. FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2) (2013); see also id. §§ .521(d)(9), .6011(1). 
27. Id. § 39.522(2); Dep’t of Children & Families v. W.H., 109 So. 3d 1269, 
1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 
974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
28. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10); W.H., 109 So. 3d at 1270. 
29. 109 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
30. Id. at 1270. 
3
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was presented at trial.
31
  The appellate court reversed given the absence of both 
notice and “an evidentiary hearing on reunification.”32 
In State Department of Children & Families v. B.D.,
33
 the trial court 
adjudicated the child dependent and placed the child with her maternal cousin as 
permanent guardian.
34
  Subsequently, the mother’s motion was granted and DCF 
was ordered to reinstate protective supervision, “without scheduling or holding 
an evidentiary hearing or setting out specific findings of fact.”35  From that order, 
the Department sought certiorari.
36
  The appellate court issued a writ quashing 
the trial court’s order.37  The appellate court opined that the trial court order 
departed from the essential requirements of law as it “failed to make specific, 
required findings of fact addressing the child’s best interest[s], stating the 
circumstances that caused the . . . dependency, and explaining [why the] 
circumstances [were] resolved.”38  The appellate court then added: 
“Time is of the essence for . . . children in [a] dependency 
system.” . . . [T]he court’s failure to comply with the express 
requirements of the law significantly disrupts what was supposed to 
be a permanent guardianship, leav[ing] the child’s status in a 
continuing state of uncertainty, subject[ing] the child to [a] risk of 
harm, and requir[ing] immediate relief that cannot be provided at 
some uncertain future time on plenary appeal.
39
 
In a third case, a mother appealed from an order granting the state’s 
motion for reunification with her two children, closing the case as to a third 
child, and placing that third child with the father.
40
  The appellate court held, 
quite simply, that an evidentiary hearing must be held where there are disputed 
facts concerning the “detriment to the child,” allowing an offending parent to 
contest the issue.
41
  As “the [trial] court made findings of fact without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing,” this was a reversible error.42 
                                                 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. 102 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
34. Id. at 708. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. B.D., 102 So. 3d at 710. 
39. Id. at 711 (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.621(1) (2013)). 
40. B.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 114 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013) (per curiam). 
41. Id. at 249. 
42. Id. 
4
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For over two decades, the Florida courts have dealt with dependency 
determinations based upon prospective neglect.
43
  In the leading case, Padgett v. 
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,
44
 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that in order to make a finding of prospective neglect, there must be “a 
nexus between the parent’s problem and the potential for future neglect.”45  The 
issue arose again in J.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re 
Interest of J.J.V.).
46
  In that case, a father appealed an order adjudicating his son 
dependent.
47
  The basis for the petition to adjudicate the child dependent was 
that the father was a danger to the son because the father was a member of the 
Bloods gang; the police officer testified that the father’s gang involvement was 
proven by his numerous tattoos.
48
  The twenty-three year old father obtained 
some of the tattoos as a teenager.
49
  Both the DCF and the Guardian Ad Litem 
(“GAL”) Program conceded error, and the appellate court recognized that while 
tattoos may indicate previous gang association, there was nothing to indicate his 
involvement in any criminal activity since he was released from prison two years 
earlier; further, all other testimony was that he “had been . . . diligent in visiting 
his son and offering financial support.”50 
Finally, in a case of first impression, perhaps nationally, in R.L.R. v. 
State,
51
 a seventeen-year-old minor in a dependency case sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel a reversal of the trial court’s order, “directing the [child’s] 
Attorneys Ad Litem [(“AAL”)] to disclose the [child’s] whereabouts,” to whom 
the child had formerly provided this information and requested that it not be 
shared.
52
  The trial court “recognize[d] the attorney-client privilege, but [found] 
the disclosure [was] required ‘for the proper administration of justice.’”53  
Finding no exception to the attorney-client privilege that would support the trial 
                                                 
43. See 1 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 4.14(4)(d) 
(2013); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 182; Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of 
Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397, 413 (2005). 
44. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
45. See id. at 568, 571; see also S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re 
Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 3d 827, 833–34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); R.M. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 40 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(citing N.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
46. 99 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
47. Id. at 578. 
48. Id. at 579. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 578, 580. 
51. 116 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
52. Id. at 571, 572 n.2. 
53. Id. at 571. 
5
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court’s order to disclose, the appellate court reversed.54  In doing so, it relied in 
part on the brief of amicus curiae the Florida Association of Counsel for 
Children, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, the National Association of 
Counsel for Children, and the Youth Law Center of San Francisco
55
 for the 
proposition that any exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege in certain lower 
court cases were inapposite.
56
  Finally, the appellate court recognized that 
“[c]ourts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have recognized and enforced the 
attorney-client privilege in dependency proceedings.”57 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Just as parents are statutorily entitled to counsel in dependency 
proceedings in Florida by statute, they are entitled to counsel in TPR proceedings 
as a matter of constitutional right.
58
  The same court in Miami that failed to 
provide counsel in a dependency case in G.W. v. Department of Children & 
Families
59
 during the course of a staccato-case shelter hearing—as discussed in 
last year’s survey article60—was reversed in F.M. v. State Department of 
Children & Families,
61
 when it defaulted a father in a termination of parental 
rights case when he failed to appear personally, although he appeared 
telephonically at the advisory hearing.
62
  At that hearing, as quoted by the 
appellate court, both the mother and father appeared by telephone.
63
  “When the 
judge discovered the father was appearing telephonically, the following brief 
exchange took place”: 
The Court [calling]:  Well that [is] not good enough.  You’re 
supposed to be here. 
The Father [calling]:  I could [not] afford it. 
The Court [calling]:  Well, that [is] really too bad. 
DCF [calling]:  How is he on the phone? 
                                                 
54. Id. at 573–74. 
55. Brief on file with the Nova Law Review. 
56. R.L.R., 116 So. 3d at 571, 573 n.5. 
57. Id. at 574 n.8. 
58. In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, 2011 
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 9, at 179. 
59. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
60. Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 
334 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
61. 95 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
62. Id. at 382–83. 
63. Id. at 380. 
6
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The Court [calling]:  Okay, so go ahead. 
Counsel for the mother:  With the mother? 
DCF [calling]:  No, that [is the father].  Judge, well, [the father] is 
present via phone.  There is publication.  His attorney over there [in 
Louisiana] was noticed to be present. 
The Court [calling]:  He is not present.  I am granting the termination 
of parental rights and closing the case.  Mr. M. has no contact with 
his children. 
. . . . 
The Court [calling]:  . . . Well, he [is] not here, and a default has been 
issued.  Mr. M., your parental rights have been terminated and you 
have no contact whatsoever with these children.
64 
Citing prior case law to the effect that the “‘termination of parental 
rights [ought] never be determined on a default basis or by gotcha practices 
when [the] parent makes a reasonable [attempt] to be present at [the] hearing and 
is delayed by circumstances beyond [that parent’s] control,’” the appellate court 
reversed the termination of parental rights.
65
 
The issue of whether parental rights can be terminated based upon the 
abuse of a sibling or another child in the family, is predicated upon a showing of 
a totality of the circumstances surrounding the current petition by applying the 
Padgett nexus test.
66
  The issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
A.J. v. Department of Children & Families
67
 was whether a father’s parental 
rights to five children should be terminated because, while there was proof of 
sexual abuse as to two daughters, the record did not provide support for a finding 
harm or a risk of harm with regard to their two brothers.
68
  While there was 
evidence of mental health problems with the two boys, it was unclear if the 
issues stemmed from the domestic abuse.
69
  On that basis, the appellate court 
reversed as to the brothers.
70
 
                                                 
64. Id. at 380–81 (alteration in original). 
65. Id. at 381, 382–83 (quoting B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So. 2d 
1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)). 
66. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991). 
67. 97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
68. Id. at 986. 
69. Id. at 987–88. 
70. Id. at 986. 
7
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In G.O. v. Department of Children & Families,
71
 the appellate court 
reversed as a matter of statutory construction because the general magistrate who 
presided over the advisory hearing found that the parents gave constructive 
consent for TPR by not appearing, and later allowed the guardian ad litem to 
testify as to the child’s best interest.72  The trial court signed an order that 
conformed to the general magistrate recommendation for TPR.
73
  Under Florida 
law, general magistrates are prohibited from presiding over advisory hearings.
74
  
The hearing at which the guardian ad litem testified “was an adjudicatory 
hearing on the petition for [TPR].”75  The appellate court reversed, since the 
proper court presiding over the adjudicatory hearing should have been the trial 
court.
76
 
The rights of putative fathers in TPR and adoption cases are limited in 
Florida by statute.
77
  In only one case, Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A.,
78
 has the 
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of the adoption statute 
as it relates to putative fathers.
79
  In S.C. v. Gift of Life Adoptions,
80
 an adoption 
agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights as a precursor to an 
adoption involving a biological mother who intended to place the child up for 
adoption with the agency.
81
  The appellate court affirmed and granted the 
petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights, but avoided any 
constitutional claim, finding that there was abandonment, which independently 
supported the granting of the petition.
82
  The father had argued that he was not 
appointed counsel in a timely fashion “until the first hearing on the petition.”83  
The court did recognize “that the filing requirements [were] very technical and 
might be a challenge to the nonlawyer biological father,”84 and in his 
concurrence, Judge Davis expressed his concern that unwed biological fathers 
                                                 
71. 100 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
72. Id. at 233. 
73. Id. 
74. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.257(h); G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233. 
75. G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233. 
76. Id. 
77. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053(1), .054(1) (2013). 
78. 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007). 
79. Id. at 191.  See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 
NOVA L. REV. 357, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law] for a 
discussion of the possible constitutional infirmities in the Florida law. 
80. 100 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
81. Id. at 774–75. 
82. Id. at 775. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
8
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should be entitled to all the due process rights of other parties, including the right 
to counsel.
85
 
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
The question of how indirect criminal contempt applies in juvenile 
delinquency cases was before the Supreme Court of Florida in J.M. v. Gargett 
(J.M. II).
86
  The specific issue was whether, when an adjudicated delinquent 
violates a single probation order on multiple occasions, that juvenile may be held 
in contempt and placed in a secure detention facility for consecutive periods.
87
  
In the case at bar, the juvenile was placed on probation and was held in indirect 
criminal contempt as a result of violating curfew, as well as violation of a second 
order to obey household rules.
88
  The juvenile was placed in secure detention for 
both offenses; five days for the first offense and fifteen days for the second.
89
  
Specifically, after the first period was satisfied, the second period began.
90
  The 
Supreme Court of Florida—recognizing a split in opinions between the Second 
and Fifth District Courts of Appeal—held that the consecutive sentences could 
properly be instituted.
91
  Justices Quince and Pariente dissented on the grounds 
that there was “only a single act of indirect contempt” under the Florida 
dependency statute.
92
 
In the second case before the Supreme Court of Florida this year, the 
issue involved a school-related matter.
93
  Juveniles are often the subject of 
delinquency cases that arise out of events which occur at school.
94
  The issue in 
J.R. v. State
95
 was whether a juvenile could be found to have committed a 
trespass on school grounds without evidence that the juvenile had formerly been 
warned by the school principal’s designee for trespassing.96  The Supreme Court 
                                                 
85. S.C., 100 So. 3d at 776 (Davis, J., concurring). 
86. 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
87. Id. at 355. 
88. Id. at 353. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 353–54. 
91. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 356–57.  Compare J.M. I, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d, 
101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
92. J.M. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 (Quince, J., dissenting). 
93. J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
94. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 10.07(1) 
(2013). 
95. 99 So. 3d 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
96. Id. at 427 (citing D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), 
review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table decision), and quashed, 67 So. 3d 
9
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of Florida held that the failure to present evidence at trial that the individuals 
who warned the child were designees of the school’s principal was reversible 
error.
97
  In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court failed 
to properly comply with the conditions for taking judicial notice under Florida’s 
rules of evidence.
98
 
The third case in the Supreme Court of Florida was Hopkins v. State 
(Hopkins II),
99
 in which the court decided the question of whether a detainee’s 
act of battery at a juvenile detention center, and charged with battery falls under 
Florida’s criminal law within this setting.100  Resolving a question of conflict 
between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal—as a matter of statutory 
construction—the court found that a detention center does qualify as a detention 
facility for purposes of the criminal law.
101
 
In what would seem like a simple proposition, juvenile court jurisdiction 
over a subject child in delinquency ends at age nineteen.
102
  In State v. E.I.,
103
 the 
appellate court—in a one-paragraph opinion—dismissed the State’s appeal as 
moot, as the juvenile had reached his nineteenth birthday.
104
  However, the court 
explained that the trial court was correct and that its jurisdiction ends over any 
child at any time after the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, “[u]nless [the] child is 
already under commitment, in a transition program, or subject to a restitution 
order.”105 
The rules concerning a determination of whether a juvenile is 
incompetent to proceed in a delinquency case are quite clear.
106
  Among them is 
the provision that the court must base its competency determination on the 
evaluation of at least “two . . . experts appointed by the court.”107  In State v. 
D.V.,
108
 following an unauthorized absence, the juvenile was charged with 
threatening school personnel.
109
  The juvenile allegedly slapped another student 
                                                                                                                   
1029 (Fla. 2011)). 
97. Id. at 430. 
98. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.201(1) (2013). 
99. 105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012). 
100. Id. at 471. 
101. Id.; see also State v. Hopkins (Hopkins I), 47 So. 3d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 63 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff’d, 
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012); T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
102. FLA. STAT. § 985.0301(5)(a). 
103. 114 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
104. Id. at 310. 
105. Id. 
106. See FLA. STAT. § 985.19. 
107. Id. § 985.19(1)(b). 
108. 111 So. 3d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
109. Id. at 235. 
10
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seven weeks later.
110
  Formerly, the juvenile had been adjudicated incompetent 
to proceed after allegations were raised with respect to the commission other 
crimes.
111
  The first expert appointed by the court evaluated the mental condition 
of the child and “determined that [the child] was not competent to proceed.”112  
The court did not appoint a second expert, relying upon an earlier report from an 
expert who had been appointed by the Department of Children and Families, on 
the grounds that one could save money in so doing.
113
  The appellate court 
reversed, finding that as a matter of statutory construction the trial court is 
required to base determinations of competency on the evaluations of at least two 
court-appointed experts.
114
  As the court only appointed one expert, reversal was 
required.
115
 
Issues of the suppression of inculpatory statements by juveniles have 
been the source of discussion in this survey on a number of occasions.
116
  In 
State v. M.R.,
117
 one of the issues on appeal was whether a statement that the 
juvenile—who was subsequently “charged in a petition for . . . possession with 
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis within 1000 feet of a school”—
made in front of his mother and in the presence of a police officer could be 
suppressed.
118
  The police officer had called the mother, and when the mother 
arrived, the juvenile was sitting, handcuffed, in the rear of a police car in custody 
and in the presence of the officer.
119
  The child said to his mother that he did not 
wish to talk to her in the presence of a police “officer and that she . . . knew why 
he was selling marijuana.”120  In this case, the respondent child did not request to 
speak with the third person––his mother––but rather, it was the police officer 
that brought the mother to the scene.
121
  The court held that “these statements . . . 
were an exploitation of the initial illegality,” citing a prior District Court of 
Appeal case as distinguishable in Lundberg v. State.
122
 
This survey does not usually discuss evidentiary issues, as they are 
generic in nature and not necessarily specific to juvenile delinquency cases.  
                                                 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 235–36. 
113. D.V., 111 So. 3d at 236–37. 
114. Id. at 237. 
115. Id. 
116. See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 151 
(2010); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 384–85. 
117. 100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
118. Id. at 274, 279–80. 
119. Id. at 275, 280–81. 
120. Id. at 275. 
121. Id. at 275, 280–81. 
122. M.R., 100 So. 3d at 280–81 (citing Lundberg v. State, 918 So. 2d 444, 445 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
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However, on occasion, the issue is germane to juvenile delinquency law.
123
  In 
D.D.B. v. State,
124
 the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile 
called “‘911 for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint or reporting 
false information.’”125  In an adjudicatory hearing, “the State . . . introduce[d] an 
audio recording of [the] two calls purportedly made.”126  The problem was quite 
simple.
127
  The identification of the child’s voice on the recording required 
“authentication, [which] would also require . . . evidence, including [the fact] 
that the recording was of a telephone call received and handled by the 911 
system on the relevant date.”128  Since there was no such evidence under section 
90.901 of the Florida Evidence Code, the court was obligated to reverse.
129
 
The second evidentiary matter, also seemingly basic in nature, arose in 
K.A.A. v. State.
130
  In that case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the 
unlawful possession of gun on school property.
131
  The trial court would not 
allow the respondent “to cross-examine the State’s juvenile witness about 
criminal charges pending against the witness.”132  Citing an earlier case to the 
effect that “‘[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses . . . outweighs the [interest of 
the State] in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records,’”133 
the appellate court reversed.
134
  It ought to have been obvious that the 
prosecution witness’s credibility would be an issue.135 
It has been forty-six years since the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled in In re Gault
136
 that children have the right to counsel in juvenile 
delinquency cases.
137
  In C.W. v. State,
138
 a juvenile appealed from an order 
adjudicating her as delinquent based upon a battery on a law enforcement 
officer.
139
  The issue was the court’s action in taking the case to trial in the 
                                                 
123. See, e.g., D.D.B. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
124. 109 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
125. Id. at 1184. 
126. Id. at 1185. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. D.D.B., 109 So. 3d at 1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (2013). 
130. 109 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. (quoting Tuell v. State, 905 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
134. Id. 
135. See K.A.A., 109 So. 3d at 1176. 
136. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
137. Id. at 41, 55. 
138. 93 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
139. Id. at 515. 
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss1/4
2013] 2013 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 93 
absence of a lawyer for the child.
140
  At the child’s arraignment, the child 
indicated that she hired an attorney.
141
  The court asked if she was sure that she 
would have the attorney represent her, since the attorney had not yet filed any 
pleadings.
142
  On the date of trial, the child indicated that she was not sure where 
her attorney was, and the court said that it was going to trial.
143
  After the trial, 
but before the disposition, an attorney was hired and filed a motion for 
rehearing.
144
  Incredibly, the court denied the motion for rehearing, noting that 
the child ‘“did indeed have a fair trial.’”145  Citing to the Florida Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure which require notification of the right to counsel at each 
stage of the proceeding and—if the child chooses to waive counsel—conducting 
a thorough inquiry to determine if the waiver was freely and intelligently made, 
the appellate court reversed.
146
 
In Florida, determinations of whether an alleged juvenile delinquent is to 
be securely detained are based upon the use of a Risk Assessment Instrument 
(“RAI”).147  In J.L.B. v. Kelly,148 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention during the course of the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding.
149
  Although he was released from detention while his 
writ was pending—and thus the matter was moot—the court on appeal ruled that 
“improper scoring of [a RAI] . . . is capable of repetition yet evading review,” 
and thus it resolved the issue.
150
  The claim involved impermissible double 
scoring.
151
  The trial court added points to the scoring process on the basis of two 
factors:  “[T]he high risk nature of [a] prior commitment and the circumstances 
of the current burglary offense.”152  The problem was that by doing so, the court 
impermissibly double-scored by acknowledging circumstances that had already 
been taken into account by the RAI, there was nothing in the State statute that 
would allow the court to do so.
153
 
                                                 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. C.W., 93 So. 3d at 515. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 515–16 (quoting FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.165(a), (b)(2)). 
147. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 380–81. 
148. 93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
149. Id. at 1138. 
150. Id. (citing T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
151. Id. at 1139. 
152. Id. at 1138. 
153. J.L.B., 93 So. 3d at 1139 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.24 (2013)). 
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The State charged a juvenile with felony criminal mischief—valued at 
$1000 or more—for $2600 of damage to an automobile.154  The auto body shop 
owner testified in support of the value of the damage, based on an employee’s 
estimate.
155
  The estimate was made in the regular course of business, but the 
estimate was never admitted into evidence.
156
  When the trial court refused to 
strike the oral testimony, trial counsel objected, and the matter in A.S. v. State
157
 
went up on appeal.
158
  The appellate court reversed on the basis of the Florida 
Rules of Evidence, specifically section 90.803(6), regarding the business records 
exception to hearsay.
159
  Here, the estimate itself would have qualified as a 
business record.
160
  “[H]owever, the testimony explaining the contents of the 
estimate,” where the estimate was not in evidence, did not fall within the 
exception.
161
  As a result, there was no competent proof of the underlying felony 
crime and the court reversed.
162
 
Restitution issues come up regularly at the dispositional stage of 
delinquency cases in Florida; issues also regularly discussed in this survey.
163
  A 
blatantly obvious reversal took place in X.G. v. State,
164
 where the juvenile 
appealed from the revocation of juvenile probation where the court’s basis for 
revocation and probation was the failure to pay restitution.
165
  The problem 
concerned a plea agreement, which stated that “no restitution would be ordered 
on the [underlying] charge.”166  Thus, the disposition order did not list restitution 
as a condition of probation.
167
 
In A.P. v. State,
168
 the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support a restitution order.
169
  The source of the evidence resulting in an order of 
$220 in restitution was the victim’s testimony, which was based upon the 
                                                 
154. A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. 91 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
158. See id. at 271. 
159. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (2013) (amended by Act effective May 
30, 2013, ch. 2013-98, § 1, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1–2). 
160. A.S., 91 So. 3d at 271. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 60, at 346; Michael J. Dale, 
2009 Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009); Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of 
Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 378. 
164. 106 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
165. Id. at 91. 
166. Id. at 90. 
167. Id. 
168. 114 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
169. Id. at 395. 
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replacement value of the item, and the source of the testimony was unknown.
170
  
Thus, according to the appellate court, the State failed to present competent 
substantial evidence of the item’s fair market value.171 
Among the requirements at the dispositional stage of the delinquency 
proceeding in Florida, is that the court strictly comply with the statutory 
provisions governing proper procedure at a juvenile disposition hearing.
172
  In 
K.P. v. State,
173
 while the court ordered a predisposition psychiatric evaluation of 
the child, the court entered a dispositional order before the psychiatric evaluation 
was available.
174
  That constituted failure to strictly comply with the statutory 
procedures, and the appellate court reversed.
175
  Similarly, at the dispositional 
stage, the trial court is obligated to prepare a written dispositional order that 
complies with its oral pronouncements.
176
  In L.D. v. State,
177
 the trial court 
failed to do so.
178
  It was conceded that the court’s written dispositional order 
was not consistent with its oral pronouncements.
179
  On the basis of the lower 
court’s failure to comply with the statutory obligations, the appellate court 
reversed.
180
 
Similarly, in R.V. v. State,
181
 the appellate court reversed the 
dispositional order of the trial court because there had been no articulation 
regarding why the dispositional alternative of a moderate risk commitment 
program is more appropriate than the Department of Juvenile Justice’s 
recommendation that the child’s rehabilitative needs should result in the least 
restrictive setting.
182
  The appellate court reversed, authorizing the “trial court 
[to] amend [its] disposition[al] order to include the required findings.”183 
Perhaps even harder to understand is the situation which required a 
reversal of a disposition in M.A.L. v. State.
184
  In that case, the trial court 
                                                 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. K.P. v. State, 97 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing K.D. 
v. State, 911 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2) 
(2013). 
173. 97 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
174. Id. at 967. 
175. Id. 
176. L.D. v. State, 107 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2). 
177. 107 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
178. Id. at 515. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2). 
181. 107 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
182. Id. at 536. 
183. Id. 
184. 110 So. 3d 493, 495–96, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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conducted a dispositional hearing outside of the appellant and her father’s 
presence, in a sidebar.
185
  The juvenile “claim[ed] that [the] sidebar conference 
violated her due process rights to be present and meaningfully heard prior to the 
disposition.”186  Shockingly, the State argued that this was harmless error.187  The 
appellate court reversed, recognizing that the issue of disposition prior to 
determination, in noncompliance with the Florida statute governing how the 
hearing should be held, constituted fundamental error.
188
 
Under Florida law, there is a variety of dispositional alternatives in 
addition to restitution;
189
 such alternatives encompass placement in a various 
residential facilities, including those described as high-risk.
190
  In D.H. v. 
State,
191
 the trial court committed a youth to a high-risk facility for a 
misdemeanor offense in its dispositional order.
192
  Florida law limits the trial 
court’s commitment authority and placement of the juvenile misdemeanant in a 
high-risk facility.
193
  Thus, the most restrictive facility to which the child could 
be sent was a moderate-risk facility; therefore, the appellate court reversed.
194
 
In G.W. v. State,
195
 juveniles in three consolidated appeals challenged 
the constitutionality of a Florida Statute governing sentencing enhancement 
when the crime committed was against a school officer.
196
  The appeal was based 
on equal protection grounds and the appellants claimed that the statute created 
“‘an elite class of untouchables’” because of the additional protection provided 
by the law to school employees.
197
  Applying a rational basis equal protection 
test,
198
 the appellate court affirmed, finding no constitutional infirmity in the 
statute.
199
 
In two major cases decided over the past four years, the Supreme Court 
of the United States dealt with questions of appropriate punishment for 
                                                 
185. Id. at 495. 
186. Id. at 496. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 496, 499; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.433(4)(d) (2013). 
189. Compare FLA. STAT. § 985.437, with id. § 985.441. 
190. Id. § 985.441(1)(b); see also id. § 985.03(46). 
191. 114 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
192. Id. at 497–98. 
193. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.441(2)). 
194. Id. at 498. 
195. 106 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 
2013) (unpublished table decision). 
196. Id. at 84; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2). 
197. G.W., 106 So. 3d at 84. 
198. Id. at 85 (citing Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 
(Fla. 2003)). 
199. Id. at 86; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2). 
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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes.
200
  In 
Roper v. Simmons,
201
 the Court held that the death penalty for individuals who 
committed criminal offenses while juveniles was unconstitutional in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
202
  In 
Graham v. Florida,
203
 the Court held that life without the possibility of parole 
for a juvenile was also unconstitutional in a felony murder setting where the 
juvenile did not commit the homicide.
204
  Then, in Miller v. Alabama,
205
 the 
Court ruled that state sentencing statutes making life imprisonment without 
parole appropriately mandatory for juvenile non-homicide offenders also violated 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
206
  In 
three intermediate appellate court opinions decided this past survey year, the 
courts dealt with the application of Graham and Miller to three juveniles tried as 
adults.
207
  The first case is Walling v. State.
208
  There, the defendant, who was 
sixteen at the time of the offense, was convicted of felony murder for 
participating in the planning of the robbery and supplying the gun, although he 
had been “waiting a few blocks away when the fatal shot was fired.”209  He was 
tried as an adult by a six-person jury.
210
  The appellate court held that under 
Roper, Graham, and Miller, the juvenile was not entitled to a twelve-person jury 
because the twelve-person jury is required when death is a possible penalty and 
that death no longer controls the question of a jury’s size when the case involves 
a juvenile.
211
 
In Reynolds v. State,
212
 the defendant had been found guilty by a jury 
and sentenced to life in prison on one count of robbery with a firearm in 2002.
213
 
 The appellate court vacated the sentence of life without parole under Graham.
214
 
                                                 
200. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005). 
201. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
202. See id. at 578. 
203. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
204. Id. at 2034. 
205. 132 S. Ct 2455 (2012). 
206. Id. at 2475. 
207. See Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); 
Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931, 931–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 
2223 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); Walling v. State, 105 So. 3d 660, 661–62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
208. 105 So. 3d 660, 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
209. Id. at 661–62. 
210. Id. at 662. 
211. Id. 
212. 116 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
213. Id. at 559. 
214. Id. 
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 The second issue before the court on remand was “‘the concept of aggregate 
sentencing on interdependent offenses, as it relates to [the] trial judge’s desire to 
effect the original sentencing plan.’”215  The appellate court held that there is no 
right to “‘modification, on remand after appeal, of [the] sentences on convictions 
[that were] not challenged on [the original] appeal.’”216  The appellate court 
further acknowledged the lack of legal decisions on point with this issue after the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in Graham, although it recognized 
general support for the proposition.
217
  Finally, as the court noted that it was not 
unconstitutional for a juvenile to receive a life sentence for a non-homicide 
crime.
218  Rather, it “is unconstitutional . . . for the State not to give [the] 
juvenile offender[] . . . ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”219
 
In a third post-Graham decision, Young v. State,
220
 the juvenile was 
sentenced to four consecutive thirty-year sentences and then was resentenced 
pursuant to Graham.
221
  One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was 
that the trial court violated Graham by “fail[ing] to consider [his] rehabilitation 
and newfound maturity.”222  The juvenile’s claim was that he was entitled to a 
hearing to prove his change in circumstances.
223
  The appellate court rejected this 
argument under Graham.
224
  Under the facts of the case, because the juvenile 
was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison, after which he would be 
released, he did have a sentence that specifically provided for his eventual 
release.
225
  Therefore, Graham did not apply.
226
  Finally, the appellate court held 
that a resentencing hearing does not require the opportunity to review 
rehabilitation.
227
  On those bases, the court affirmed.
228
 
                                                 
215. Id. at 562 (quoting Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1984)). 
216. Id. (quoting Fasenmyer, 457 So. 2d at 1366). 
217. Reynolds, 116 So. 3d at 562. 
218. Id. at 563. 
219. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
220. 110 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 5C13-929, 2013 
WL 5614109 (Fla. 2013). 
221. Id. at 931–32 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034). 
222. Id. at 932. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 933. 
225. Young, 110 So. 3d at 934. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 936. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Florida decided three important technical matters 
in the delinquency field this past survey year.
229
  In dependency and termination 
of parental rights cases, the intermediate appellate courts decided a large number 
of cases, a number of which involved obvious and basic failures to comply with 
Chapter 39 by the trial courts.
230
  One case in particular, R.L.R. v. State, was 
particularly noteworthy, as it upheld the right of a juvenile to confidentiality with 
his volunteer AAL in a dependency case, over the objections of the GAL 
Program and the DCF.
231
 
                                                 
229. See J.M. II, 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Hopkins II, 105 So. 
3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 430 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
230. See, e.g., A.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 97 So. 3d 985, 986–87 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
231. R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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